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Judicial Intervention in Admission
Decisions of Private Professional
Associations
Francis Ascherman, a licensed and practicing physician on the
staffs of several hospitals in the San Francisco area, wanted to
practice at a hospital closer to his home office, so he applied for
staff membership at the privately run Saint Francis Memorial
Hospital.1 The hospital summarily rejected Ascherman's applica-
tion, without a hearing, because he had not obtained three letters
of recommendation from active members of the Saint Francis staff,
as required by one of its by-laws. Ascherman sued the hospital,
alleging that the rule was unfair and contending that the hospital
had to consider his qualifications based on the evidence he
presented in his application.2 The California Court of Appeal held
that the by-law violated minimal common law standards of fair
procedure and directed that an injunction be issued compelling
Saint Francis to reconsider. Ascherman's application "pursuant to a
fair procedure." s
The Ascherman case is the most radical departure to date
from the long-standing position of American courts that admission
decisions of private professional associations are not subject to ju-
dicial scrutiny.4 This comment examines the basis for this depar-
ture from the rule against intervention. After reviewing the tradi-
tional rationales for nonintervention, the comment assesses the
seminal New Jersey Supreme Court case of Falcone v. Middlesex
County Medical Society.5 That case held that an association exer-
cising monopoly power over a profession has a legal duty to act in
a reasonable manner in making admission decisions.6 The com-
1 Ascherman v. Saint Francis Memorial Hosp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 507, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507
(1975).
2 Id. at 509, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 508. Ascherman's file contained 22 letters of reference
from physicians not on the Saint Francis staff. Id. at 509 n.2, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 508 n.2.
3 Id. at 514, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
" See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
5 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
6 Id. at 591-96, 170 A.2d at 796-99. See infra notes 25-29, 36-37, and accompanying
text. For contemporaneous commentary on Falcone, see Note, Judicially Compelled Admis-
sion to Medical Societies: The Falcone Case, 75 HARv. L. Rnv. 1186 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Harvard Note]; Note, Expulsion and Exclusion from Hospital Practice and Organ-
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ment argues that Falcone rests on dubious ground, and it endeav-
ors to develop a more principled test for intervention. Finally, the
comment concludes that, even if the Falcone rationale is sound,
decisions such as Ascherman have distorted its meaning and ex-
tended judicial involvement far beyond its legitimate bounds.
I. THE TRADTmONAL RULE
Private associations have been part of American society since
its inception.7 As Alexis de Tocqueville noted, "Americans of all
ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associa-
tions." s The Encyclopedia of Associations' lists almost 15,000 pri-
vate associations at the national level alone. Thousands of these
groups have state and local affiliates, and there are countless other
local and regional associations.
Private professional associations perform a -number of impor-
tant functions. They provide library facilities, referral services, and
opportunities for professional contacts and continuing education.
In addition, they provide services to the public at large. For exam-
ple, private associations can accredit professional schools, review
qualifications of those who are considered for public office, and set
professional standards for their members. Moreover, private as-
sociations that screen their members can provide a further service
to the public. Membership in an association can give the layman
an easy way to distinguish among professionals he would find oth-
erwise indistinguishable. Other things being equal, the professional
ized Medical Societies, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 327 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Rutgers Note];
Note, The Physician's Right to Hospital Staff Membership: The Public-Private Dichotomy,
1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 485; Note, Exclusion from Private Associations, 74 YALE L.J. 1313
(1965).
7 "The Puritans who migrated to New England did so under the aegis of private com-
panies with charters from the crown, one of the few instances in which a private government
has had almost complete jurisdiction over a geographical area." C. Gun, HIDDEN HIERAR-
CRIES: THE PROFESSIONS AND GOVERNMENT 10 (1966). On the role of private associations in
American history, see generally B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1976); C.
Gmn, supra, at 10-52, 251-54; THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICA (K. Lynn ed. 1965).
8 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 114 (P. Bradley trans. 1945). He
continued:
[Americans] have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take
part, but associations of a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, general
or restricted, enormous or diminutive .... If it is proposed to inculcate some truth or
to foster some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they found a society.
Wherever at the head of some new undertaking you see the government of France or a
man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association.
I1 GALE RESEARCH COMPANY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS (D. Akey 15th ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS].
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who is a member of an exclusive professional organization will
likely be more qualified than one who is not.10
The traditional rule is that courts will not intervene in the af-
fairs of private professional associations, so that the associations
will be able to serve these purposes effectively." Until the last two
decades, this rule of nonintervention was axiomatically extended to
private associations' admission decisions.'
In addition to the deep-rooted value of allowing individuals to
associate with whomever they please,'3 several other considerations
support this rule. First, strong private associations are an impor-
tant safeguard against excessive governmental power. Public
supervision of private groups could foster a society in which diver-
sity, freedom, and individual initiative were replaced by a bu-
reaucratic state directing "what shall be orthodox"' 4 in every facet
of daily life. As Professor Zechariah Chafee argued in 1930:
The health of society will usually be promoted if the groups
within it which serve the industrial, mental, and spiritual
needs of citizens are genuinely alive. Like individuals, they
will usually do the most good if they are free to determine
their own lives .... Legal supervision must often be withheld
for fear that it may do more harm than good. The principle of
freedom and growth is too easily overlooked by judges. 5
10 For a more negative evaluation of the functions performed by private professional
associations, see C. GIB, supra note 7, at 53-81.
21 See Medical Soc'y of Mobile County v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 138-40, 16 So. 2d 321,
324-25 (1944); Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 199, 162
A.2d 324, 329 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1960), aff'd, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961); State ex
rel. Hartigan v. Monongalia County Medical Soc'y, 97 W. Va. 273, 276, 124 S.E. 826, 827
(1924); Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76
HARv. L. Rav. 983, 1045-55 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; Annot., 137 A.L.R.
311 (1942).
12 See, e.g., Medical Soc'y of Mobile County v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 138-40, 16 So. 2d
321, 324-25 (1944); Moles v. White, 336 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Trautwein
v. Harbourt, 40 N.J. Super. 247, 260, 123 A.2d 30, 37 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) ("The
general rule is that there is no legal remedy for exclusion of.. .an individual from admis-
sion into a voluntary association, no matter how arbitrary or unjust the exclusion."); Huf-
faker v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 280-82, 540 P.2d 1398, 1401-02 (1975). See also Chafee, The
Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. REv. 993, 1027-28 (1930);
Rutgers Note, supra note 6, at 337.
1" See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1959); L. TRmE, AMmucAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 974-80 (1978).
14 West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (involving the
unrelated issue of compulsory salutes to the flag).
" Chafee, supra note 12, at 1027 (1930). See also Developments, supra note 11, at 990
("Strict judicial supervision of the internal affairs of associations might be so burdensome as
to hamper a group's functioning.").
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Second, courts lack the expertise to review the judgments of
private associations."6 A court is ill-equipped to determine, for ex-
ample, whether a physician with a particular educational back-
ground would be more valuable to a particular hospital than would
another physician with different credentials.1 7 And although a pri-
vate professional association inevitably will make occasional incor-
rect decisions, the costs of a judicially designed system for ensuring
correct decisions in every case may be prohibitive. In other words,
the association's admission procedure may be the most cost effec-
tive and socially efficient possible.
Finally, arbitrary exclusion of qualified applicants may be a
self-correcting problem. If a professional association does not make
admission decisions based on ability, membership will not be
viewed as an indicium of quality in the profession, 8 and rejected
applicants will not be injured professionally. In such circum-
stances, other associations may be formed that more faithfully en-
sure quality in the profession.
There are, to be sure, statutory and constitutional limitations
on the autonomy of private organizations. For example, the Su-
preme Court has held that the antitrust laws forbid bar associa-
tions from prescribing minimum attorney's fees schedules. " Sec-
tion 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids
discrimination in employment on the bases of race, color, religion,
Is See Chafee, supra note 12, at 1024 (warning that judicial intervention would lead to
a "dismal swamp," because courts have limited expertise and analytical competence com-
pared with that of private groups). See also Developments, supra note 11, at 991; Harvard
Note, supra note 6, at 1194.
17 See Harvard Note, supra note 6, at 1194.
6 See Chafee, supra note 12, at 1027 ("A due regard for the corresponding interests of
others is desirable, but must be somewhat enforced by public opinion.").
Is Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Fee schedules were held to con-
stitute horizontal price fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976). 421 U.S. at 783, 786-88, 791. The general rule regarding price fixing is that "a combi-
nation formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity. . . is illegal per se." United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co. (Madison Oil), 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). For an argument that the antitrust laws
forbid only those price fixing agreements that reduce allocative efficiency, and thus should
be construed to permit many forms of maximum price fixing, see Easterbrook, Maximum
Price Fixing, 48 U. Cm. L. Rav. 886 (1981).
See also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), where the Arizona Supreme Court's
regulation banning advertising by attorneys was attacked under the Sherman Act and the
first amendment. The Court held that the regulation was state action and struck down the
regulation on first amendment grounds. Id. at 384. Horizontal price fixing principles might
have been applied here had there been no state action, for a ban on advertising would seem
to restrict attorneys' abilities to compete on the basis of price, thus facilitating agreements
among them to maintain prices at a high level.
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sex, and national origin."' And where a private group engages in
"state action," the fourteenth amendment's due process clause21
may require judicial supervision of the group's membership
practices.1 2
These limitations generally do not apply to the issue at hand.
Decisions departing from the traditional rule of nonintervention.
have not rested on statutory considerations, and several of the
opinions have emphasized that the defendant organizations were
"nongovernmental" for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.23
Instead, courts intervening in the admission practices of private or-
ganizations have rested their decisions on common law principles
and public policy concerns.
II. RATIONALES FOR INTERVENTION
The threshold requirement for judicial intervention is the
breach of a legal duty. Focusing on Falcone v. Middlesex County
Medical Society,24 this part examines and criticizes the asserted
duty of a private professional association not to exclude qualified
applicants from membership.
A. Falcone
Doctor Falcone received a Doctor of Osteopathy degree from a
school not accredited by the American Medical Association
("AMA"), but he passed the New Jersey licensing examination and
studied for seven months at an AMA-approved school in Italy,
where he earned an M.D. degree.2 5 Despite these qualifications, the
Middlesex County Medical Society ("Society") denied his applica-
tion for active membership because of an unwritten by-law requir-
ing all members to have been trained for four years at an AMA-
approved school. Falcone sued the Society, and the New Jersey Su-
preme Court struck down the unwritten by-law as contrary to pub-
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 550 n.7, 526
P.2d 253, 259 n.7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 251 n.7 (1974) (en banc) ("It is important to note that
the legal duties imposed on defendant organizations arise from the common law rather than
from the Constitution as such: ... the "due process" concept is applicable only its
broadest, nonconstitutional connotation."); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 396,
192 A.2d 817, 821 (1963); Davidson v. Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 19 Ohio App. 2d 246, 250
N.E.2d 892 (1969).
24 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
25 Id. at 584-85, 170 A.2d at 793.
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lic policy.2 6
The court justified its intervention by pointing to the effective
monopoly power wielded by the Society: the AMA controlled the
accreditation of all the hospitals in the region, and a prerequisite
for accreditation was that all the physicians on the staffs of the
hospitals be members of the Society.2 7 Therefore, the unwritten
rule that excluded Falcone from the Society also effectively ex-
cluded him from practicing at any local hospital, because any hos-
pital that had him on its staff would not be accredited by the
AMA. The hospitals depended on accreditation to procure the ser-
vices of physicians, interns, and nurses. 28 The court argued that by
virtue of this monopoly control, the Society's power was "to be ex-
ercised in a reasonable and lawful manner for the advancement of
the medical profession and the public generally.
29
The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on James v. Marinship
Corporation,0 a California case involving the arbitrary refusal of a
trade union to allow black laborers to become members. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court there held that because the union had
closed-shop agreements with potential employers, binding the em-
ployers to hire only union members, 1 the union owed all potential
members a duty of fair dealing.3 2 The court analogized to the com-
mon law rule that one who pursued a "common calling," such as a
common carrier, an innkeeper, or a blacksmith, was obliged to
serve all comers reasonably.3 According to the court, those en-
gaged in common callings historically enjoyed virtual monopolies
over their services in their communities; courts thus imposed a le-
gal duty on these individuals to exercise their monopoly power in a
nonarbitrary, reasonable manner."
Finding that a labor union with closed-shop agreements exer-
24 Id. at 598, 170 A.2d at 800.
" This fact was noted in the lower court's opinion. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medi-
cal Soc'y, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 203-05, 162 A.2d 324, 334-35 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1960), afl'd,
34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
" Harvard Note, supra note 6, at 1192. Loss of AMA accreditation might also have
jeopardized state accreditation. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
26 34 N.J. at 597, 170 A.2d at 799.
25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
" See generally R. GoRmAN, BAsIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 641-42 (1976). Closed-shop
agreements like the one in Marinship, where union membership is a precondition for both
initial and continued employment, are now illegal under section 8(a)(3) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
11 25 Cal. 2d at 731-33, 155 P.2d at 335-36.
32 Id. at 732, 155 P.2d at 335-36 (citing Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverer's Union,
123 N.J. Eq. 347, 350, 197 A. 720, 722 (Ch. 1938)).
" Id.
1982]
The University of Chicago Law Review
cised similar monopoly control, 5 the California court held that the
union was likewise limited in its discretion in admitting members.
Just as the only inn in town cannot arbitrarily refuse to rent a
room to someone, leaving him without shelter for the night, so a
union cannot arbitrarily refuse membership to a skilled craftsman,
leaving him without a chance to pursue his calling.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Falcone found that the So-
ciety had the same monopoly power as the union in Marinship and
thus the same duty to use its power in a reasonable manner.38 Be-
cause the court found that the Society had acted arbitrarily in de-
nying membership to Doctor Falcone, effectively depriving him of
the chance to practice medicine, it voided the action and ordered
the Society to accept Falcone as a member.37
B. Criticisms of Falcone
The common calling analogy employed in Marinship and Fal-
cone can be attacked on several grounds. First, the analogy rests
on a slender reed. The common law subjected a person to common
calling status because he "held himself out to serve the public gen-
erally, making that his business, and in so doing assumed to serve
all members of the public who should apply, and to serve them
with care." 8 It was because an individual represented that his ser-
vices were available to all who chose to use them that he was clas-
sified as one engaged in a common calling.3 ' Private associations, in
contrast, do not hold themselves out to the public at large. They
serve the public by being selective in membership rather than by
being indiscriminately inclusive; if membership is to be an indi-
cium of quality, standards and by-laws must be set, and exclusions
3Id.
- 34 N.J. at 597, 170 A.2d at 799.
' Id. at 597-98, 170 A.2d at 800.
Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies (pt. 1), 11
COLUM. L. Rav. 514, 515 (1911) (footnotes omitted). See also L. GORTON, THz CONCEPT OF
THE COMMON CARRIER IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw 79, 80-81 (1971); 1 R. HUTCHINSON, A TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF CARRMES 44 (3d ed. 1906); 9 Am. Jur. 2D Carriers § 4, at 43 (1964) ("the
dominant and controlling factor in determining the status of one as a common carrier is his
* . . holding out"); Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its
Scope and Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 312, 314 (1962) ('Generally, the duty to offer
service extends as far but no further than the company's undertaking.. . .") (footnote
omitted).
39 Scholars have noted the tautology of this definition. See L. GORTON, supra note 38,
at 11 ("he who holds himself out to the general public is a common carrier, and he who is a
common carrier must hold himself out to carry for anybody who chooses to use him"); 1 R.
HUTCHINSON, supra note 38, at 59.
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from membership must occur. One may question the wisdom and
fairness of some associations' standards, but the questionable qual-
ity of a decision does not alone create an affirmative legal duty.
One may point to instances of substantial harm resulting from an
association's adverse decisions, but the weight of an interest is also
insufficient in itself to create a duty to benefit that interest."0
Thus, unlike traditional common calling services, private associa-
tions do not meet the essential holding-out requirement.
Rather than focus on this requirement, Marinship and Fal-
cone argued that the law of common calling was grounded on a
different rationale: monopoly power over a matter that concerned
the public."1 The argument that the status of common calling arose
out of monopoly power is hotly contested, however.42 There is
scant evidence for the view that "common" meant "monopolistic";
people classified at common law as those engaged in common call-
ings-innkeepers, farriers, smiths, tailors, and the like-enjoyed no
more of a monopolistic position than those not so classified, such
as butchers and carpenters.'8 Even if common calling professions
ever did enjoy a monopolistic status, they have long since become
competitive; nevertheless, their special duties survive.44 The reli-
ance of Marinship and Falcone on monopoly power is therefore
misplaced.
Moreover, if the courts are going to ground the rule of com-
mon calling on concerns of monopoly power, there is no apparent
reason why the rule should not be applied to corporations and pri-
vate educational institutions as well as to unions and professional
40 This principle is a cornerstone of the criminal law, see, e.g., W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 26, at 183-87 (1972); of the civil law, see, e.g., W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 324-26 (4th ed. 1971); and of constitutional law,
see, eg., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-571 (1972) ("to determine whether due
process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the
nature of the interest at stake").
41 See James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731-32, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944); Fal-
cone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 597, 170 A.2d 791, 799 (1961).
42 Compare Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARv. L. REv. 135, 156 (1914) ("No-
where [in the common law] is monopoly suggested as the distinguishing characteristic .... )
with Wyman, The Law of Public Callings as a Solution to the Trust Problem (pt. 1), 17
HARv. L. REV. 156, 161 (1903) ("virtual monopoly" is the "characterizing thing" of the law
of public callings).
43 Adler, supra note 42, at 149. Wyman himself admits that only "circumstances...
suggest" monopolistic status as the defining principle; nowhere in the cases is there explicit
reliance on that status. Wyman, supra note 42, at 161.
44 See L. GORTON, supra note 38, at 102-05. For an analysis of and argument against
the use of market power in determining common carrier status in the communications field,
see Comment, Common Carriers Under the Communications Act, 48 U. Cm. L. l~v. 409,
413, 433-37 (1981).
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associations. Private universities that offer unique and valuable
training in a given field apparently would meet the Marinship-Fal-
cone definition of common calling status, thereby subjecting their
admissions processes to possible judicial scrutiny.45 Boeing Air-
craft, the only major employer of jet aircraft engineers in the Pa-
cific Northwest, would appear to be under a similar duty to act
reasonably in making its hiring decisions.46 One observes no such
special duty, however, even though Boeing probably wields as
much power over the career of an individual engineer as the Soci-
ety exerted over Doctor Falcone's career or as the trade union had
over the career of the excluded worker. Courts intervening in the
admission practices of private associations have offered no expla-
nation for these disparities and no limiting principles that would
prevent judicial scrutiny of all "important," "monopolistic" private
activity.
There is a further problem with the monopoly-based defini-
tion: the Falcone line of cases have not defined "monopoly." In the
area of antitrust law, this definitional problem is the subject of
ongoing debate among lawyers, economists, and judges.47 In anti-
trust cases, the courts have developed a "relevant market" yard-
stick by which to measure possible monopoly power;48 that yard-
stick has two dimensions-the product market and the geographic
market. The product market concept tests the definition of the
product at issue, examines the "functional interchangeability" of
that product with "market alternatives," and studies the cross-
elasticity of demand between the product and alternatives. 49 The
geographic market concept is a short-hand phrase used to describe
, Private universities receiving federal assistance are under a statutory duty to refrain
from discrimination in admissions based on race, color, or national origin, see Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), or based on sex, see Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). These statutory duties apply to all
universities receiving federal assistance, regardless of their size or the caliber of their aca-
demic programs.
" Although Boeing is subject to statutory duties to refrain from employment discrimi-
nation, see, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1976), and to deal fairly with employees, see, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
201-219 (1976), such duties apply to corporations irrespective of their market share.
47 See, e.g., 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANrrrrausr LAW §§ 500-528 (1978); R. PosNER,
ANTITRusT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8 (1976); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST 33-40 (1977).
4S See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962); 2 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 47, §§ 507, 517-58; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 47, §§ 12-21.
" See, e.g., International Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 252 (1959);
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-404 (1956).
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the area within which the strength of competition is measured.50
Determining the relevant product and geographic markets is "a
necessary predicate" to deciding whether economic activity vio-
lates the antitrust laws. 1
One might argue that a county is much too small a geographic
unit for evaluating the impact of a county medical society's ad-
verse admission decision, for medical schools have nationwide re-
ferral services, and medical services are in demand throughout the
country. Similarly, one could argue that a skilled tradesman denied
membership in one union could pursue a variety of other callings.
Although Marinship and Falcone present particularly compelling
fact situations, their conclusionary uses of the monopoly concept
are troubling.
Other possible justifications for judicial intervention in admis-
sion decisions of private associations are even weaker than the Fal-
cone "common calling" rationale. As discussed in part II-C below,
the fourteenth amendment's state action requirement precludes
imposing procedural due process requirements on private associa-
tions in all but the rarest of cases.62 Similarly, potential plaintiffs
would have great difficulty proving the tort of willful interference
with prospective economic advantage because, in most cases, the
intent element could not be proved.53 In addition, a rejected appli-
cant would usually lack a cause of action under antitrust law be-
cause he would have difficulty showing the required injury to com-
petition, as opposed to injury to a competitor.5'
50 See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 419 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1974); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962).
"1 United States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618 (1974).
5, See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
U Harvard Note, supra note 6, at 1191-92. On the intent requirement, see W. PROSSER,
supra note 40, § 129, at 927-28; on the interference tort generally, see Perlman, Interference
with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine,
49 U. Cm. L. REV. 61 (1982).
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (Sherman Act
protects "competition not competitors").
An older line of cases, not expressly overruled by Brunswick, holds that harm to indi-
vidual competitors caused by monopolistic boycotts is sufficient to raise an antitrust claim.
Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). A private association sued under this theory could
probably defend itself successfully on two grounds. First, it is difficult to point to a boycott
in the exclusion cases. In Falcone, unless the hospitals in the county got together and agreed
that all must be accredited, the fact that all sought AMA accreditation seems simply to
represent a choice made by each hospital. In the Ascherman situation, it is even more clear
that the hospital was acting alone and not as part bf a boycott. Second, a medical society,
for example, that was sued under the boycott theory could probably argue successfully that
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Another alternative rationale to the one in Falcone is that ex-
clusion from a society imposes an injury that is in substance no
different from explusion; because expulsion has been subjected to
judicial scrutiny, 5 exclusion should be reviewed under the same
standard. The flaw in this argument is that the similarity of the
injury in the two cases does not establish the existence of the same
legal duty. The willingness of courts to intervene when an individ-
ual is expelled from an organization stems from a legal relationship
existing between an individual and an association to which he be-
longs. Some of the resulting rights are palpable. For example, a
member of an association may have a right to share in the physical
assets of the association if it dissolves.56 Other rights are essen-
tially contractual. When an individual joins an association, the in-
dividual and the association enter into a contract with one another,
and an implicit term in the contract that cannot be waived is a
duty of fair dealing.57 An association that arbitrarily expels an in-
dividual arguably violates this duty. Even if one does not rely
explicitly on notions of property or contract rights, the obligations
of an association to members necessarily differ from its duties to
outsiders with whom it has never dealt. A general duty to treat all
strangers on the same basis as members of a group is inconsistent
with the principle that individuals should be free to associate with
whomever they please.58 This is not, of course, to say that an asso-
ciation should have no duties in its dealings with strangers, but
only that whatever the duty is, it is different from (and lesser
than) its duties to those with whom it has established re-
lationships.
the relevant market for physician's services is nationwide. See supra notes 48-52 and accom-
panying text. Thus, a society's ability to prevent a physician from practicing in a given
county would not constitute an effective monopolistic restraint for purposes of the antitrust
laws.
65 See, e.g., Van Daele v. Vinci, 51 Ill. 2d 389, 282 N.E.2d 728, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1007 (1972); Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 42 Ill. App. 2d 352, 369, 192 N.E.2d
414, 422-23 (1963); State ex rel. O'Brien v. Petry, 397 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965);
Higgins v. American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191, 238 A.2d 665 (1968); Annot.,
89 A.L.R.2d 964 (1963); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 531 (1951).
" See Developments, supra note 11, at 999-1001.
57 See Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369, 369 (1980):
A majority of American jurisdictions, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts [§ 231],
and the Uniform Commercial Code [§ 1-203] . . . now recognize the duty to perform a
contract in good faith as a general principle of contract law. The conduct of virtually
any party to any contract accordingly may be vulnerable to claims of breach stemming
from this obligation.
58 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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C. A Proposed Analysis
The one promising avenue in defense of the results in Marin-
ship and Falcone is to analyze the extent to which a private
group's power derives directly from governmental support. For ex-
ample, a private university's preeminence in a given field results
from the school's own efforts in hiring faculty and encouraging re-
search. Similarly, Boeing has achieved its strength through market
forces such as economies of scale:59 the reason there is only one
major manufacturer of large jet aircraft in the Pacific Northwest is
that the world's economy justifies only a few such firms.
On the other hand, a union and a medical society are powerful
largely because of governmental intervention on their behalf. For
example, although the government prohibits price-fixing agree-
ments among sellers of goods, 0 it permits similar efforts by union
members to sell their services to employers at a uniform price.61
Moreover, the government supervises a union's elections,62 ensures
that the employer will bargain with it," and guarantees it an ex-
clusive monopoly of representation."
Similarly, the medical society in Falcone was powerful because
of its ties with the AMA, which performs a quasi-licensing function
by accrediting hospitals and imposing uniform standards on
them.65 Although one could argue that such activities are private,
they are closely intertwined with governmental functions; lack of
accreditation can be the "kiss of death":e6
Private accrediting activities would be far less effective if
it were not for public laws recognizing and enforcing the pri-
"See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342, 345 (D.
Mass.) (Wyzanski, J.) (dictum) (defendant could escape antitrust liability if it proved its
monopoly power arose solely from superior skill, natural advantages, better products, eco-
nomic or technical efficiency, or "economically inevitable" factors), aff'd per curiam, 347
U.S. 521 (1953); In re E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 705, 747-48 (1980) (corpo-
ration excused from antitrust liability because its power resulted from efficiency).
" The general rule is that such agreements are per se illegal, on the theory that they
constitute a "threat to the central nervous system of society." United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co. (Madison Oil), 310 U.S. 150, 223, 226 n.59 (1940). See supra note 54.
61 Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503-04 (1940) ("[A]n elimination of price com-
petition based on differences in labor standards is the object of any national labor organiza-
tion. But this effect of competition has not been considered to be the kind of curtailment of
price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act.").
" National Labor Relations Act, § 9(b)-(e), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)-(e) (1976).
Gs Id. § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
Id. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
" See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
" C. G,.B, supra note 7, at 59.
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vate standards. Many professions have persuaded their state
legislatures to write into state licencing laws requirements
that professional education be in an accredited school or col-
lege, or give some form of special advantage to those with
preparation in such institutions .... States have rarely
accredited hopitals not approved by the AMA. Even when
state boards have done their own accrediting, they have usu-
ally paid close attention to the professional association's rec-
ommendations.67
By filling a function that might have been filled by a state body, an
association such as the AMA might find itself under a special obli-
gation to act in a nonarbitrary manner.
Many of the concerns discussed here are factors that have
been considered-and rejected-in the fourteenth amendment
state action context. For example, in Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 68 the Supreme Court considered a claim against a pri-
vately owned utility that had terminated a customer's electric ser-
vice for nonpayment without adequate notice and a hearing. Met-
ropolitan Edison provides a vital public service, is a monopoly
licensed by the government, is subject to pervasive governmental
regulation, and offers a service that many governmental units pro-
vide themselves.8 9 Nevertheless, the Court rejected all claims of
state action. It held that, absent direct state support for the spe-
cific practice under challenge, state conferral of monopoly status is
insufficient to meet the "encouragement" and "authorization"
branch of state action doctrine.70 It also held that a private entity
performs a "public function," thereby meeting the state action re-
quirement, only where it exercises "powers traditionally exclusively
reserved to the state. 71 Finally, the Court rejected application of
67 Id. Many private associations cultivate governmental assistance in their attempts to
control qualifications, preparation, entry, and practice in their professions. See id. at 134-40.
See generally Note, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and Politics in
Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 937 (1954).
68 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
6'9 See id. at 350-51; id. at 362 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 366-68 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
10 Id. at 351-52. See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (holding unconstitu-
tional a state constitutional amendment that made private discrimination in real estate
transactions immune from state regulation).
71 419 U.S. at 352-53. See also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (sale of
goods to satisfy a warehouseman's lien not a public function); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S.
507 (1976) (shopping center does not meet public function doctrine requirements; effectively
overruling previous cases); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (public park that reverted
to private ownership still performed a public function because its "predominant character
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the "significant state involvement" strand of state action doctrine,
finding no "symbiotic relationship" between the state's regulation
of the utility and the utility's termination practices.72
The elements of constitutional state action analy-
sis-"encouragement" and "authorization," "public function," and
"significant state involvement"-offer a useful framework in the
search for a nexus between governmental activity and a private as-
sociation's power over professional careers. These elements, how-
ever, need not be given the same circumscribed meaning in the
common law context as in the fourteenth amendment context, for
the two serve different functions."3 In "common law state action"
analysis, relevant factors would include whether an association's
monopoly power resulted from governmental authorization and ex-
clusion of others; the degree of governmental regulation; whether
the function performed by the association would otherwise be un-
dertaken by the state; and the degree to which the state relied on
the association's decision in its own decisionmaking.
If courts are to intervene in private associations' admission de-
cisions, the most reasoned approach might be by way of a three-
step analysis. A court should first determine the relevant geograph-
ical and product markets74 and whether, within those markets, the
private association exercises monopoly power. The court should
then consider the nexus between the association's monopoly posi-
tion and state action. Finally, it should balance the plaintiff's dep-
rivation against the traditional reasons for nonintervention: respect
for private autonomy, an association's greater expertise, and the
and purpose... [were] municipal"); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 463 (1953) (pre-general elec-
tion selection of candidates for public office a public function); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946) (company town serves public function).
" 419 U.S. at 357-58. On the state involvement doctrine, see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants unconstitutional). The
potentially broad implications of Shelley have been narrowed substantially. See, e.g., Evans
v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (permissible for courts to enforce racially motivated reverter
clause in charitable trust). See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961) (racially segregated coffee shop leased from state agency met state action
requirement).
71 State action is required in the constitutional context because the fourteenth amend-
ment reaches only actions that can be attributed to the state itself; the amendment does not
authorize the creation of a "code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights." Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). States may engage in such regulation, however, and a
"common law state action" requirement would merely serve to ensure that private power
was sufficiently attributable to direct state intervention so that imposing duties of fair deal-
ing in return for that support would be appropriate.
7" See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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possibility of self-correction through market forces.7 5 This three-
step test would narrowly circumscribe instances of judicial inter-
vention in private associations' admission decisions, and rightly so:
the alternative Falcone approach is self-expanding, historically fal-
lacious, and fails to respect private autonomy.
III. DEFINING THE REQUIRED DEPRIVATION
Courts intervening in the admission decisions of private orga-
nizations have almost uniformly relied on the Falcone rationale. 6
Jurisdictions differ, however, on the limits of that doctrine. Illinois
is typical of jurisdictions whose courts have taken a narrow view of
intervention by holding that deprivation of anything short of an
economic necessity does not warrant judicial intervention." Illinois
courts have therefore denied a right of action where a doctor was
not allowed membership in the American Association of Orthope-
dic Surgeons.78 Membership was a factor relied on by hospitals in
granting hospital privileges and by insurance companies in setting
malpractice rates, 9 but, unlike Falcone, hospitals would not jeop-
ardize their accreditation by accepting a nonmember on their
staffs.8 0 Moreover, in a case almost identical to Ascherman, an Illi-
nois court refused to intervene where a doctor who was affiliated
with several hospitals was denied privileges at a more conveniently
located hospital.$'
California courts take a much more expansive view of inter-
vention, holding that they can review a private association's admis-
75 See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
76 See, e.g., Blende v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 393 P.2d 926
(1964); Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1969); Triester v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 78 Ill. App. 3d 746,
396 N.E.2d 1225 (1979), appeal denied, 79 IM. 2d 630 (1980); Salter v. New York State
Psychological Ass'n, 14 N.Y.2d 100, 198 N.E.2d 250, 248 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1964); Davidson v.
Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 19 Ohio App. 2d 246, 250 N.E.2d 892 (1969).
7 See, e.g., Triester v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 78 Ill. App. 3d 746,
755, 396 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (1979), appeal denied, 79 Ml. 2d 630 (1980). Other states observ-
ing a similarly restrictive view of intervention include Florida, Moles v. White, 336 So. 2d
427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Monyek v. Parkway Gen. Hosp., Inc., 273 So. 2d 430 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1973); and New York, Salter v. New York State Psychological Ass'n, 14
N.Y.2d 100, 198 N.E.2d 250, 248 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1964).
71 Triester v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 78 Ill. App. 3d 746, 396
N.E.2d 1225 (1979), appeal denied, 79 IMI. 2d 630 (1980).
79 Id. at 748-49, 396 N.E.2d at 1227.
8o Id. at 755, 396 N.E.2d at 1232.
" Jain v. Northwest Community Hosp., 67 Ill. App. 3d 420, 385 N.E.2d 108 (1978),
appeal denied, 75 Il1. 2d 591 (1979).
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sion decisions whenever membership is a "practical necessity, '8 2
without which an individual could not "realize maximum potential
achievement and recognition" in his chosen profession.83 California
courts have therefore intervened where the harm has been simply
to withhold referral of patients to the plaintiff8 ' and, in As-
cherman, where the plaintiff was prevented from practicing at one
of many San Francisco hospitals.8 5
The California standard effectively is no standard at all. Mem-
bership in an association always imparts benefits-recognition, ed-
ucation, contacts, fraternity-to its members; that is the purpose
for its existence. Exclusion of any applicant from any association
reduces his chances for "maximum potential achievement." For ex-
ample, a traveling shoe salesman presumably would find member-
ship in the National Shoe Traveler's Association valuable; that
group sponsors twenty regional shoe shows each spring and fall,
holds training seminars for members, and publishes a newsletter.86
And a surplus goods dealer would be well-advised to join the Asso-
ciated Surplus Dealers, a group that promotes trade shows, serves
as a valuable liaison with government agencies, offers group insur-
ance coverage, recognizes achievement through member awards,
and publishes newsletters and catalogues.87 Applicants rejected
from these and thousands of other private groups could plausibly
argue that exclusion reduced their possibilities for "maximum po-
tential achievement and recognition" in their fields.
Though purporting to rely on Falcone, the expansive Califor-
nia view focuses only on the extent of the harm involved in a given
exclusion; hence the emphasis on "maximum potential achieve-
ment." Properly read, the Falcone rationale supports a special le-
gal duty only as a function of an organization's monopoly power
over an individual's professional livelihood. The Society in that
*2 Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 166, 460 P.2d 495, 499,
81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (1969).
03 Id. Other states apparently embracing this more expansive view of intervention in-
clude New Jersey, Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963); Arizona,
Blende v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 393 P.2d 926 (1964); and Ohio,
Davidson v. Youngstown Hoasp. Ass'n, 19 Ohio App. 2d 246, 250 N.E.2d 892 (1969).
" Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 166, 460 P.2d 495, 498,
81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 626 (1969).
" Ascherman v. Saint Francis Memorial Hosp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 507, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507
(1975); see supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
36 See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AsSOCIATIONS, supra note 9, at 228, entry 2834. The associa-
tion has 6600 members. Id.
"= See id. at 230, entry 2860. The group has 400 members and is open to "[s]urplus
dealers, general merchandise dealers, close-out dealers, manufacturers, manufacturers' rep-
resentatives, and others." Id.
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case had the ability to deny Doctor Falcone the right to practice
medicine in the county because of the accreditation standards its
parent organization imposed on hospitals in the area."' Because of
this absolute power over Falcone's professional livelihood, a special
duty was imposed on the Society that outweighed, in the court's
view, the benefits flowing from nonintervention. 9
Most associations, by contrast, do not wield such absolute
power over the professional destinies of applicants. An orthodon-
tist society's ability to reduce the number of referrals received by
an orthodontist who is denied membership, 0 and the ability to
cause Doctor Ascherman inconvenience in not being able to work
at one hospital,91 do not cause the sorts of injuries that give rise to
a special legal duty. 2 Such harms necessarily flow from the exis-
tence of private associations with selective admission standards.
Moreover, the amount of harm erroneously inflicted is not likely to
be large in the aggregate because such associations can flourish
only when the standards they use for admission benefit the public
at large.
The general forces of the market will not prevent all arbitrary
acts of exclusion. Market forces would not, for example, prevent
medical societies from excluding those who testify as expert wit-
nesses for plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions. But the defects
in a legal regime featuring intervention only when an association
exercises power like that in Falcone may be fewer than the defects
of a regime that allows intervention whenever a denial of member-
ship inflicts significant injury.
Salter v. New York State Psychological Association" provides
a useful example. Salter was a practicing psychologist denied mem-
bership in the New York State Psychological Association because
he did not meet the group's requirement that members have done
graduate work in psychology to qualify.9 Salter had graduated
" See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
89 Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 597, 170 A.2d 791, 799
(1961).
0 See, e.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495,
81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969).
81 Ascherman v. Saint Francis Memorial Hosp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 507, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507
(1975).
92 See also Blatt v. University of S. Cal., 5 Cal. App. 3d 935, 85 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1970)
(law student who attended night school not admitted to Order of the Coif, although his
grades would have warranted admission had he been a day student; no judicially enforceable
right to admittance).
Is 14 N.Y.2d 100, 198 N.E.2d 250, 248 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1964).
91 Id. at 103, 198 N.E.2d at 251, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
[49:840
Intervention in Admission Decisions
from college and had gone directly into practice before New York
passed a licensing law requiring graduate work in psychology for
all practitioners. 5 The law contained a "grandfather clause" that
allowed those in practice for a certain number of years to continue
practicing without obtaining any advanced training;96 the associa-
tion, however, made no such exception. 7
The association had no effective licensing power similar to
that of the medical society in Falcone. Membership in it was valu-
able to practitioners, because in addition to the services it pro-
vided and the ability it had to speak for the profession in setting
standards, membership itself was a credential that signaled supe-
rior skill. Anyone denied membership suffered economic harm,' 8
but the harm resulted from the respect the public gave to the judg-
ment of the society rather than from monopoly power that the so-
ciety exercised. The New York Court of Appeals adhered to the
restrictive standard, found no economic necessity, and dismissed
the case. 99 California courts would probably have reached a differ-
ent result. Indeed, the harm suffered here seems as great, if not
greater, than that suffered by Doctor Ascherman. 00
Courts, however, are poorly situated to second-guess the pro-
cedures a society uses to judge potential members. It does not
seem unreasonable to think that whether a psychologist has done
graduate study bears some relationship to his skills. Although a
society might not be able to expel members without such train-
ing,10 1 it would seem that it should be able to make such a judg-
ment about applicants without having to justify its decisions in a
courtroom.
CONCLUSION
Setting limits on judicial intervention in the admission deci-
sions of private organizations has led to considerable confusion.
This comment has attempted to cut through this confusion to es-
tablish a principled framework for analysis. The Marinship-Fal-
" 1956 N.Y. Laws 1626-1629, ch. 737, §§ 7601, 7605(d) (repealed 1971).
, 1959 N.Y. Laws 1151, ch. 374, § 7605(5) (repealed 1971).
97 14 N.Y.2d at 103, 198 N.E.2d at 251, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
9, That harm would include the decrease in the number of patients who came to him
because of public recognition that the association had refused to endorse him and fewer
referrals to him from members of the association. If the public viewed him as being less
capable, a rejected applicant also might be forced to charge lower prices.
" 14 N.Y.2d at 107, 198 N.E.2d at 253, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
10 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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cone common calling analysis should be discarded: private associa-
tions are not analogous to common calling endeavors, and the
monopoly rationale is historically inaccurate and without limiting
principles. Rather, if courts are to intervene, an analysis along the
lines of the approach offered in part II-C should be employed. A
court should determine first, whether an association in fact exer-
cises virtual monopoly power over an activity; second, whether
there is a sufficiently strong nexus between that private power and
state action in support of the association; and finally, whether the
exclusion deprives an individual of all opportunities to pursue his
professional livelihood in the relevant market. A broader standard
would lead to inappropriate and possibly dangerous judicial inter-
vention in private associational activities.
Robert S. Trefny
